Testing Overreaction and Under-reaction in the Commodity Futures Market by DAI, Jingyu
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access) Dissertations and Theses
2012
Testing Overreaction and Under-reaction in the
Commodity Futures Market
Jingyu DAI
Singapore Management University, jingyu.dai.2009@mf.smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll
Part of the Agribusiness Commons, and the Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons
This Master Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access) by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
DAI, Jingyu. Testing Overreaction and Under-reaction in the Commodity Futures Market. (2012). Dissertations and Theses
Collection (Open Access).
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll/89
  
 
 
Testing Overreaction and Under-reaction in the  
Commodity Futures Market 
 
 
 
 
DAI JINGYU 
 
 
 
 
SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT UNIVERSITY 
2012
Testing Overreaction and Under-reaction in the  
Commodity Futures Market 
 
By  
Dai Jingyu 
 
Submitted to Lee Kong Chian School of Business in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the Master of Science in Finance 
 
Dissertation Committee: 
 
Jerry Cao 
Assistant Professor of Finance 
Singapore Management University 
 
Jeremy Goh 
Associate Professor of Finance 
Singapore Management University 
 
 
Chua Choong Tze 
Assistant Professor of Finance 
Singapore Management University 
 
 
Tu Jun 
Assistant Professor of Finance 
Singapore Management University 
 
SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT UNIVERSITY 
2012 
 
Copyright (2012) Dai Jingyu
Abstract 
 
Results from previous studies testing for under-reaction and overreaction in the 
commodity futures market are mixed and inconclusive. Using a data of more than 20 
categories of future contacts ranging from agricultural, metal and energy, we have 
found significant evidence of under-reaction in food and agricultural commodities but 
not in the energy and metal sector. It is also found that those relatively inactive 
commodity future contracts tend to have a stronger tendency to under-react than 
commodity future contracts are very actively traded. The result also agrees with the 
behavioral hypothesis that under-reaction is caused by gradual incorporation of 
information among investors. 
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Introduction 
 
1. Background 
 
After the proposal of efficient market hypothesis by Fama (1970), it is had been 
assumed that global financial markets, whether it is equity, foreign exchange, or 
commodity futures, are efficient. Prices in these markets, are supposed to reflect all of 
the current information and there is not supposed to be any method that could beat the 
market consistently.  
 
Yet, later studies from other scholars have displayed proofs contrary to the EMH 
theory. As Shiller (1981) pointed out “We have seen the measure of stock price 
volatility over the past century appear to be far too high – five to thirteen times too 
high – to be attributed to new information about future real dividends.” “The failure 
of efficient market model is thus so dramatic that it would seem impossible to 
attribute such things as data errors, price index problems, or changes in tax law.” Such 
doubts in the efficient market hypothesis have pointed to the discovery of 
overreaction and under-reaction.  
 
In the equity market, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) found that “loser” portfolios tend to 
earn about 25% more than “winner” portfolios 36 months after portfolio formation, 
which points towards the overreaction hypothesis. Later studies such as De Bondt and 
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Thaler (1987), John S and Howe (1986), Atkins and Dyl (1990), C.A., Costa (1994), 
David N. Dreman and Michael A. Berry (1995) have provided further proof for the 
existence of overreaction in the stock market. 
 
In the Foreign Exchange Market, Goodheart (1988) has found that that in the short 
run, exchange rates tend to under-react to news, especially news of interest rate 
change. Larson and Madura (2001) have found that in the short run, currencies in 
emerging markets tend to overreact while currencies in industrial markets tend to 
under-react; they have also found that exchange rates have a tendency to under-react 
to defined economic and political news while overreact in days without the presence 
of such news.  
 
Overreaction and under-reaction have nowadays been proved extensively. The 
psychological theory that provides grounding for these two phenomena includes 
representative heuristics, conservatism, self-attribution, disposition effect, gradual 
incorporation of private information and overconfidence in private information. 
 
Academic researches have discovered the phenomenon of stock market under-reaction 
to a series of news events such as earning surprises, open market share repurchases, 
negative modification to analyst’ forecasts and stock splits. In 1990, Shleifer and 
Summer proposed the investor sentiment/limited arbitrage hypothesis to explain 
under-reaction, they proposed that some one of the strategies arbitragers use is ‘trend 
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chasing’: as noisy traders, they buy when the price goes up, in expectation of further 
price appreciation. They mentioned that sometime rational arbitragers also jump on 
the bandwagon created by noisy traders, buy when the price goes up and sell when 
price goes down. Another strategy of this sort is ‘stop loss’ orders, in which the 
investor sells after a prescribed level of loss regardless of future prospects. Behavior 
of investors in this model causes under-reaction, since investor’s behavior intensifies 
and prolongs the rally or decline in the market. 
 
Daniel et al (1998) proposed that under-reaction is induced by biased self-attribution 
of market participants. The self-attribution theory states that people tend to credit 
themselves for past success, and blame external factors for failure (Fischhoff (1982), 
Langer and Roth (1975), Miller and Ross (1975), Taylor and Brown (1988)); this 
cause the confidence of market participants who acted upon private information to 
grow when public information agrees with his information, but not to fall when public 
information contradicts with his information, which causes drift after public news 
announcements.  
 
Barberis et al (1998) suggested that under-reaction is caused by conservatism of 
investors: investors might disregard the full information content of a public news 
announcement and still sling partially to their prior estimate of earnings. 
Conservatism is defined by (Edward (1968)) as the slow updating of models in face of 
a new evidence. Hong and Stein (1999) attributed under-reaction to the gradual 
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incorporation of private information to market participants. Frazzini (2006), however, 
proposed that the disposition effect, which causes investors to ride losses and realized 
gains, causes under-reaction to news. In Frazzini’s model, when good news comes out, 
investors have the tendency to sell the security in order to realize gains, which causes 
the securities to be traded below fundamental level; while when bad news com out, 
investors who are caught in a loss are reluctant to sell the securities, which causes a 
premium to the security price. 
 
Overreaction (De Bondt and Thaler 1985) was first found prior to under-reaction, and 
according to Kahneman and Tvesky, it was caused by representative heuristics: “In 
revising their beliefs, individuals tend to overweight recent information and 
underweight prior data; people seem to make predictions according to a simple 
matching rule: “The predicted value is selected so that the standing of the case in the 
distribution of outcomes matches its standing in the distribution of impression””. Such 
psychological bias causes investors to buy on previous gains in the market and sell on 
previous losses in the market, which cause the market to “overreact”. This could also 
be a cause for market under-reaction in the short run. 
 
Daniel et al (1998) suggested that overreaction is caused by investor’s overconfidence 
in private information; overconfidence is a psychological phenomenon that has been 
found in miscellaneous studies from various fields, such as Oskamp (1965), 
Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead (1981), Kidd (1970), Wagenaar and Keren 
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(1986) etc. According to Einhorn (1980), overconfidence is more severe for diffuse 
tasks, which require judgment than for mechanical tasks, and more severe for tasks 
with delayed result feedback than for tasks that have immediate and conclusive 
outcome. According to Daniel et al (1998), making investment decision is a diffused 
task while the correctness of the decision is both lagged and unclear; thus people tend 
to be more overconfident in investment than in other fields. 
 
While overreaction and under-reaction have been proved extensively in the equity 
market, there have been few papers studying overreaction and under-reaction in the 
commodity market. Whether these phenomena exist in the commodity market, and 
whether they are caused by the same psychological drivers as they did in the equity 
market remains unclear. 
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2. Literature review 
 
 
a) Results 
 
In this section, we seek to review important previous studies in the field of 
commodity futures overreaction and under-reaction, their procedure and the results 
that they have obtained. Previous studies testing for overreaction and under-reaction 
in the commodity futures market are scarce, among them, the methodologies 
employed are miscellaneous and results obtained are also mixed and inconclusive. 
 
Stevenson and Bear (1970) found subtle results of overreaction in the commodity 
futures market. Stenvenson and Bear conducted a test of the random walk hypothesis 
on corn and soybean futures using price data of July futures from 1957 to 1968 and 
find a generally negative serial correlation coefficient of the close to close daily price 
difference with lag of 1 day. For lags of 5 days, the serial correlation coefficient is 
found to be mainly positive. Their study casts doubts on the application of the 
efficient market hypothesis in the commodity market.  
 
Ma, Dare and Donaldson (1990) conducted a study on six agricultural commodities 
future contracts and two metal future contracts testing for rationality in this market. In 
their study, Ma, Dare and Donaldson used daily price changes to test for overreaction 
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and under-reaction. A significant change in price is defined as a proxy for the 
occurrence of significant events, and similar to Stevenson and Bear, they used the 
difference between daily closing prices to account for daily price change. It is 
observed that after a significant abnormal price change has occurred, agricultural 
futures such as Coffee, Corn, Soybean meal, Wheat and Pork Bellies show significant 
price reversal on the next trading day, whereas the results for metal contacts, i.e. gold 
and silver appear to be mixed and insignificant.  
 
Gay, Kale, Kolb and Noe (1994) studied the opening price of commodity futures 
subsequent to wall street journal headlines that describe the abnormal trading 
activities of a certain commodity in the previous day and found signs of 
under-reaction in the commodity future market. They selected Wall street journal 
headlines that only describe the trading activity of the previous day thus this news 
should contain only historical information and does not contribution to the current 
information set of this commodity, if market is efficient, there is supposed to be no 
significant cumulative return on the next trading day. Examples of news headlines that 
Gay et al use are as follows: 
 
“Price of Cocoa Rises after Producers, Consumers Agree on Plan for Surplus” (WSJ, 
January 19 1988, p 56) 
“Copper Prices Plunge 7.1 Cents to Close Below $1 a pound for the first time since 
1988” (WSJ, January 28, 1988, p. 36) 
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All information contained in these headlines are already delivered to the investor on 
the previous trading day hence should have no impact for the opening price on the 
next day. Yet, by measuring the difference between the opening price of the second 
day and closing price of the previous day of the specific commodity described in the 
news headline, Gay, Kale, Kolb and Noe found that market tend to open higher when 
the report on the previous day express bullish sentiment and tend to open lower when 
the report on the previous day express bearish sentiment. The opening-price drift is 
found to be larger for bearish reports than for bullish reports.  
 
Chen (1998) conducted yet another study testing for overreaction in the futures 
market. The contracts Chen used in his analysis include corn, soybeans, soybean meal, 
soybean oil, wheat, feeder cattle, live cattle, copper, gold, silver and cotton. Chen 
used three methods to measure overreaction: the average of the future price on the day 
after the event day, the opening price of the post-event day and the closing price of the 
post event day. The results found in three measures are different from each other, yet 
the level of significance is unable to provide sufficient basis for the overreaction and 
under-reaction hypothesis in three measures. 
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b) Previous Methodologies 
 
In this section, we will compare and discuss the methodologies employed by former 
academic researchers to test for overreaction and under-reaction in commodity 
futures.  
 
In order to define overreaction and under-reaction, first we need to define what level 
of reaction is considered normal, thus the amount of abnormal reaction could be 
measured. In the equity market, we usually measure the normal level of reaction using 
the CAPM model, yet in the commodity market; it is hard to price commodity futures. 
According to Fischer BLACK (1976): 
 
 
Where △P refers to the expected return of a future contract. BLACK also mentioned 
that beta could be approximately zero for many commodities. Thus, we might want to 
consider using the actual return to model for the abnormal return in the measurement 
of overreaction and under-reaction. 
 
Stevenson and Bear (1970) measure the serial correlation of Corn and Soybean Future 
on the Chicago Board of Trade using a lag of 1 day, 2 days and 5 days respectively. 
Stevenson and Bear used the difference between the closing price of the previous day 
and the closing price of that day to measure the return for a day. 
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Ma, Dare and Donaldson (1990), used trading days that have statistically significant 
returns as proxies for significant events. The return of each future contract on the next 
trading day is thus measured to observe overreaction and under-reaction. To measure 
the abnormal component of price change, Ma used the Box and Jenkin’s method of 
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model to evaluate the expected 
component of commodity prices. The ARIMA model for each future contract in Ma et 
al’s study is displayed in table 1.  
 
The study done by Gay, Kale, Kolb and Noe (1994) used WSJ headlines that only 
delivers information regarding the price movement of a specific commodity future on 
the previous day as significant events. The opening price of that specific commodity 
future contract on the day of WSJ news is then compared with the closing price of the 
previous trading day as a proxy for abnormal return; as Gay, Kale, Kolb and Noe 
mentioned: “because future contracts require no net investment and should contain 
little, if any, risk premia over the short time intervals for which these tests are 
conducted, the expected change in future prices should be virtually nil.”  
  11
 
 
 
Table 1
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Study by Chen (1998) also used significant price changes as event days, and measured 
the price change on the next trading day to test for overreaction and under-reaction. 
Chen used the difference between the average price of day 1 and the closing price of 
the event day (day0) to measure the return for day 1, and used the difference between 
the closing price of event day and day -1 to define days with a significant return. The 
average price of day 1 is calculated using the average of the opening, closing, high 
and low for that day. Chen also used the actual daily movement of the future price as a 
proxy for abnormal movement in prices. 
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 Data and Methodology 
 
1. Data  
 
The data employed in this study includes 26 categories of commodity future contracts, 
among them fifteen are food and agricultural commodities, three are metal contracts 
and eight belong to energy commodities. Table 2 is a summary of all the future 
contracts studied in the data and the number of observations for each future contract.  
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Name of Future Contract NO. of Observation 
Food and Agricultural 
CBOT Soybean Oil Crude BO 12883 
LIFFE Coffee, Robusta (10 Tonne) LQ 4926 
CME Cattle Feeder(Average) FC 9768 
CBOT Wheat  No. 2 Soft Red W- 12886 
WCE Canola  No. 1 WC 8961 
CBOT Soybean Meal  48% Protein SM 12884 
CME Hogs, Lean  Average IowaS Minn LH 11213 
ICE Coffee C Columbia KC 9511 
KCBT Wheat  No. 2 Hard Winter KW 10245 
CME Cattle Live Choice Average LC 11528 
CBOT Soybeans  No. 1 Yellow S- 12884 
TYCOM Rubber #3 YR 4336 
ICE Cotton  1-1 16 CT 12809 
LIFFE Sugar #5, White LW 5150 
LIFFE Cocoa #7 LO 6123 
Metals 
Nymex Copper High Grade HG 12816 
Nymex Gold GC 8955 
NYMEX Silver SI 11823 
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Energy 
NYMEX Crude Oil WTI CL 6875 
NyMEX Heating Oil HO 7973 
NYMEX Crude Oil Brent NB 5359 
TYCOM Kerosene IO 2734 
ICE Gas-Oil-Petroleum LF 6145 
NYMEX Gasoline, Blendstock RB 2668 
Tocom Gasoline IN 2734 
NYMEX Natural Gas, Henry Hub NG 5114 
    Table 2 Summary of Commodity Future Contracts 
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2. Methodology 
 
In this paper, we seek to test for overreaction and under-reaction by measuring the 
return of a future contract on the next day following a significant increase or decrease 
in price has occurred in the previous day. According to Gay, Kale, Kolb and Noe 
(1994), “future contracts require no net investment and should contain little, if any, 
risk premia over the short time intervals for which these tests are conducted, the 
expected change in future prices should be virtually nil.” Thus we assume for the one 
to two days of period in which our test is conducted, the abnormal return of a 
commodity future contract is equal to its actual return. Also, return characteristics 
measured using the actual return has better trading implications, since it is extremely 
difficult to construct an accurate model for pricing of commodity futures. 
 
Similar to Stevenson and Bear (1970), we measure the daily return of a commodity 
contract using the price difference between the closing price of the contract on that 
day and the closing price of the previous day. We didn’t use the method of Chen 
(1998), e.g. the difference between the next day’s average price and the closing price 
of the event day because future prices contain lots noises at the high and low point 
and a daily average computed based on the daily high low is interfered by such noise; 
the use of average price to measure overreaction and under-reaction also has little real 
world trading implications. We have used the difference between closing prices as we 
believe the daily settlement price of a certain contract, is the most accurate reflection 
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of investors expectation of the value of that specific commodity. 
 
In order to simplify our analysis, we are only using price data from the newest 
commodity contract available. For example, CBOT Soybean meal 48% Protein 1975 
January contract expires at 14 Jan 1975, but the 1975 February contract starts trading 
at 17 Dec 1974, so starting from 17 Dec 1974, we will use the price data of 1975 Feb 
contract in our analysis. Since there is a significant spread between contracts of 
different months, the return data for the first trading day of each new contract is 
highly diluted. In order to control for this dilution of data, we consider the return for 
the first trading day of each monthly contract as 0. 
 
We define event days as days in which the price of a commodity contract has 
increased or decreased significantly. For a certain trading day, we calculate the 
standard deviation of the return of the past 200 trading days, which we call τ. Three 
types of event days are defined:  
 
1. Days in which the absolute value of the daily return is greater than τ. 
2. Days that satisfy situation (a), while at the same time, the cumulative return of the 
past 5 trading days is also greater than the 5-day τ of the past 200 trading days. 
3. Days in which the absolute value of the daily return is greater than two times of τ. 
 
For each future contract, each event day is categorized as days that represent bullish 
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events and days that represent bearish events. The cumulative average return of 
bearish events and bullish events are calculated for scenario 1 to scenario 3 
respectively. The number of bullish and bearish event observations for each scenario 
is displayed in table 3 below. 
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 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
 bullish obs bearish obs bullish obs bearish obs bullish obs bearish obs 
CBOT Soybean Oil Crude BO 1683 1548 425 266 436 289 
LIFFE Coffee, Robusta (10 Tonne) LQ 518 478 131 75 154 136 
CME Cattle Feeder(Average) FC 1168 1037 250 229 162 171 
CBOT Wheat  No. 2 Soft Red W- 1522 1525 351 234 314 265 
WCE Canola  No. 1 WC 1065 1018 257 175 271 226 
CBOT Soybean Meal  48% Protein SM 1547 1308 395 208 419 290 
CME Hogs, Lean  Average LH 903 792 156 111 46 52 
ICE Coffee C Columbia KC 1043 1023 242 156 273 249 
KCBT Wheat  No. 2 Hard Winter KW 1273 1138 327 161 304 235 
CME Cattle Live Choice Average LC 1291 1168 258 230 124 138 
CBOT Soybeans  No. 1 Yellow S- 1592 1438 435 238 429 383 
TYCOM Rubber #3 YR 504 470 121 83 96 128 
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ICE Cotton  1-1 16 CT 1342 1343 242 258 269 271 
LIFFE Sugar #5, White LW 567 479 128 99 128 108 
LIFFE Cocoa #7 LO 710 694 151 96 168 148 
Nymex Copper High Grade HG 1693 1480 421 228 383 328 
Nymex Gold GC 1120 1001 231 181 266 259 
NYMEX Silver SI 1429 1333 325 202 372 364 
NYMEX Crude Oil WTI CL 895 849 156 147 180 171 
NyMEX Heating Oil HO 945 866 186 123 203 186 
NYMEX Crude Oil Brent NB 720 655 142 114 156 131 
TYCOM Kerosene IO 344 267 85 61 63 51 
ICE Gas-Oil-Petroleum LF 755 673 162 120 165 144 
NYMEX Gasoline, Blendstock RB 310 290 46 44 47 52 
Tocom Gasoline IN 292 284 67 61 36 51 
NYMEX Natural Gas, Henry Hub NG 515 483 129 94 120 109 
Table 3 
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After we have made sufficient adjustments to the data itself, we will then measure the 
price reaction of different future contracts to the scenarios and events mentioned in 
table 3. We will discuss our results as three sectors of commodity futures respectively: 
e.g. food and agricultural, metals and energy.  
 
Consider the event day as day 0, if the cumulative average daily return at day t + 1 for 
bullish events is both economically and statistically significantly positive, while the 
cumulative average daily return at day t+1 for bearish events is both economically and 
statistically significantly negative, it means this sector of commodity under-reacts to 
significant price changes.  
 
If the cumulative average daily return at day t + 1 for bullish events is both 
economically and statistically significantly negative, while the cumulative average 
daily return at day t+1 for bearish events is both economically and statistically 
significantly positive, it means this sector of commodity overreacts to significant price 
changes. 
 
Since commodity prices have changed dramatically from the 1950s to nowadays, for 
example, gold price nowadays is almost 8 times of that in the 1970s, when calculating 
daily returns for day t +1, using absolute return in our analysis will dilute our results 
towards to patterns of recent years. We need to transfer the absolute return of 
contracts to percentage return using the following formula: 
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Percentage return = Absolute return / closing price of future contract at event day 
 
In the commodity futures market, there is no so-called “private information” as in the 
stock market; yet certain information are indeed “private” in the sense that only 
people who are within the related industry would be able to know these information 
so precisely as to make an investment decision. For example, while the information 
that there is a drought in China, Henan Province could be known to all, only the 
farmers on site would have a precise idea regarding how severe rice plantation has 
been affected; while the information that high oil price has reduced petrol 
consumption from cars is public, only staffs working in the petrol stations would 
know exactly how severe has demand for petrol been influenced. 
 
Larson and Mardura (2003) used the 3-days abnormal return proceeding the event day 
as a proxy for the amount of private information leakage; considering the slower 
diffusing of information in the commodity market, we use the 5-day return before the 
event day as a proxy for the amount of “private” information that is incorporated 
among investors. If under-reaction is due to the gradual incorporation of these 
information, the phenomenon of under-reaction, if any, should become less significant 
in scenario 2 compared to in scenario 1. If overreaction is detected, and if 
overreaction in the commodity market is indeed due to investors’ overconfidence in 
private information, the degree of overreaction should also be more severe in scenario 
2 than in scenario 1 since more private information has been incorporated into 
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investors. 
 
Larson and Mardura (2003) also mentioned: “The Tendency for a reversal is expected 
to be stronger when the initial price change is more extreme.” If overreaction or 
under-reaction is indeed caused by over-response to information or gradual diffusion 
of information, when the initial price change is larger, either the market has 
over-responded to in a greater manner (overreaction) or more information would have 
been diffused into the market (under-reaction). Thus, return data in scenarios 3 is 
expected to demonstrate weaker forms of under-reaction or stronger forms of 
overreaction in general compared to scenario 1.  
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Results and Discussions 
 
Results for Scenario 1 are displayed in table 4 below: we are able to find strong 
evidence of under-reaction for food and agricultural commodities in general, but not 
for metals and energy commodities. In the food and agricultural group, we have found 
strong under-reaction for all contracts except ICE Cotton, Liffe Cocoa and Liffe Sugar 
NO. 5; among them, results for Feeder Cattle and Live Cattle are strongest in terms of 
statistical significance, while results for Liffe Coffee and TOCOM Rubber exhibit the 
largest magnitude of under-reaction. In the metals group, we were able to find slight 
evidence of overreaction in Comex Gold, however both the degree of reaction and 
statistical significance were not great; results for copper and silver revealed neither 
overreaction nor under-reaction. In the energy group, results appear to be diffused, 
TOCOM Kerosene, TOCOM Gasoline and ICE Gasoil showed some signs of 
under-reaction, while results from the rest of the products appeared random.  
 
The reason for overreaction to be spotted mostly only in the food and agricultural 
group might be due to that financial markets for metal and energy are generally more 
active and developed than that of food and agricultural commodities. Highly 
developed financial markets attract more players and attention, hence the market 
becomes more “efficient” to information; while in less developed financial markets, 
diffusion of information would be slower and hence the gradual incorporation of 
information causes these markets to under-react. The fact that we find stronger sign of 
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under-reaction in Liffee Coffee compared to ICE Coffee supports this hypothesis, as 
we know Coffee contract listed on ICE is more active than the one listed on Liffe; the 
meat commodities, which are found to show strongest evidence of under-reaction, 
happen to be less active compared to the other agricultural commodities as well. In the 
energy market, the three contracts that are found to show some signs of under-reaction 
are also relatively non-mainstream contracts compared to the rest of the energy 
contracts studied in this paper. Another reason causing the food and agricultural 
commodities to act differently from metal and energy commodities could be that the 
percentage of non-commercial players in Metals and Energy far exceeds that in the 
food and agricultural sector. Non-commercial players such as hedge funds are more 
sensitive to certain information than commercial players and hence speed up the 
process of incorporation of information in these markets. This assumption is in line 
with our result that meat commodities show stronger sign of under-reaction than 
agricultural commodity contracts in general, as there are less non-commercial players 
in the meat commodity contracts.
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Scenario 1 
 
Next day 
Return of 
Bullish 
Events 
t value obs 
Next day 
Return of 
Bearish 
Events 
t value obs 
Food and Agriculture 
CBOT Soybean Oil Crude BO 0.21% 4.5 1683 -0.06% -1.35 1548 
LIFFE Coffee, Robusta (10 Tonne) 
LQ 
0.39% 3.43 518 -0.27% -2.36 478 
CME Cattle Feeder(Average) FC 0.18% 6.36 1168 -0.12% -3.38 1037 
CBOT Wheat  No. 2 Soft Red W- 0.09% 1.88 1522 -0.08% -2 1525 
WCE Canola  No. 1 WC 0.09% 1.94 1065 -0.23% -5.09 1018 
CBOT Soybean Meal  48% Protein 
SM 
0.24% 4.19 1547 -0.09% -1.24 1308 
CME Hogs, Lean  Average LH 0.18% 3.22 903 -0.08% -1 792 
ICE Coffee C Columbia KC 0.13% 1.35 1043 -0.04% -0.51 1023 
KCBT Wheat  No. 2 Hard Winter 
KW 
0.20% 3.72 1273 -0.10% -2.02 1138 
CME Cattle Live Choice Average LC 0.21% 7.16 1291 -0.11% -3.14 1168 
CBOT Soybeans  No. 1 Yellow S- 0.15% 3.14 1592 -0.12% -2.36 1438 
TYCOM Rubber #3 YR 0.27% 2.61 504 -0.32% -2.53 470 
ICE Cotton  1-1 16 CT 0.00% -0.03 1342 -0.06% -1.35 1343 
LIFFE Sugar #5, White LW 0.04% 0.6 567 0.03% 0.32 479 
LIFFE Cocoa #7 LO 0.04% 0.59 710 -0.03% -0.35 694 
Metals 
Nymex Copper High Grade HG 0.04% 0.75 1693 0.04% 0.71 1480 
Nymex Gold GC -0.05% -1.04 1120 0.06% 1.4 1001 
NYMEX Silver SI 0.02% 0.29 1429 -0.01% -0.17 1333 
Energy 
NYMEX Crude Oil WTI CL -0.07% -0.79 895 -0.08% -0.92 849 
NyMEX Heating Oil HO -0.02% -0.28 945 0.04% 0.5 866 
NYMEX Crude Oil Brent NB 0.00% 0 720 0.05% 0.54 655 
TYCOM Kerosene IO 0.34% 3.85 344 -0.16% -1.32 267 
ICE Gas-Oil-Petroleum LF 0.15% 1.74 755 -0.12% -1.27 673 
NYMEX Gasoline, Blendstock RB -0.05% -0.35 310 0.06% 0.36 290 
Tocom Gasoline IN 0.14% 1.33 292 -0.08% -0.75 284 
NYMEX Natural Gas, Henry Hub NG -0.03% -0.17 515 -0.25% -1.6 483 
         Table 4 
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Results for Scenario 2 are displayed in table 5 below. In the food and agricultural 
group, most agricultural commodities that used to show clear sign of under-reaction in 
Scenario 1 are no longer showing sufficient evidence for under-reaction. Results for 
some agricultural products are random, while some others still exhibit signs of 
under-reaction without sufficient statistical significance; Canola is the only product 
that still shows clear signs of under-reaction in Scenario 2. All meats commodities, in 
the meantime, continue to show evidence of under-reaction, with a weaker statistical 
significance compared to Scenario 1. Results have also become more random in the 
metal and energy group. In general, under-reaction has become weaker in Scenario 2. 
 
This result corresponds with our prior hypothesis that under-reaction in Scenario 2 is 
supposed to be weaker than that in Scenario 1. Due to the amount of information that 
has already been diffused and reflected in the market during the previous 5 days, less 
information to be incorporated in to the market causes weaker under-reaction. Meat 
Commodities are still showing stronger levels of under-reaction compared to other 
contract categories, since meat markets are less developed than other commodity 
markets. 
 
.
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Scenario 2 
 
Next day 
Return of 
Bullish 
Events 
t value obs 
Next day 
Return of 
Bearish 
Events 
t value obs 
Food and Agriculture 
CBOT Soybean Oil Crude BO 0.16% 1.55 425 -0.06% -0.42 266 
LIFFE Coffee, Robusta (10 Tonne) LQ 0.08% 0.28 131 0.22% 0.78 75 
CME Cattle Feeder(Average) FC 0.26% 4.29 250 -0.14% -1.53 229 
CBOT Wheat  No. 2 Soft Red W- 0.27% 2.12 351 0.11% 0.95 234 
WCE Canola  No. 1 WC 0.25% 2.26 257 -0.17% -1.46 175 
CBOT Soybean Meal  48% Protein SM 0.39% 2.88 395 0.00% 0.01 208 
CME Hogs, Lean  Average IowaS Minn 
LH 
0.41% 2.85 156 -0.23% -1.18 111 
ICE Coffee C Columbia KC 0.32% 1.24 242 0.33% 1.27 156 
KCBT Wheat  No. 2 Hard Winter KW 0.46% 3.55 327 0.22% 1.46 161 
CME Cattle Live Choice Average LC 0.28% 3.71 258 -0.06% -0.59 230 
CBOT Soybeans  No. 1 Yellow S- 0.26% 2.59 435 -0.05% -0.31 238 
TYCOM Rubber #3 YR 0.13% 0.58 121 -0.42% -1.07 83 
ICE Cotton  1-1 16 CT 0.13% 0.93 242 0.03% 0.26 258 
LIFFE Sugar #5, White LW 0.07% 0.42 128 0.29% 1.41 99 
LIFFE Cocoa #7 LO 0.33% 1.99 151 -0.21% -0.11 96 
Metals 
Comex Copper High Grade HG 0.00% 0.01 421 0.14% 0.84 228 
Comex Gold GC -0.04% -0.26 231 0.09% 0.74 181 
COMEX Silver SI 0.16% 0.92 325 -0.36% -1.46 202 
Energy 
NYMEX Crude Oil WTI CL -0.42% -1.39 156 0.13% 0.49 147 
NyMEX Heating Oil HO -0.28% -1.01 186 0.18% 0.77 123 
NYMEX Crude Oil Brent NB 0.11% 0.47 142 0.068 0.29 114 
TYCOM Kerosene IO 0.64% 4.21 85 -0.35% -1.25 61 
ICE Gas-Oil-Petroleum LF 0.07% 0.26 162 0.12% 0.49 120 
NYMEX Gasoline, Blendstock RB -0.23% -0.71 46 0.35% 0.68 44 
Tocom Gasoline IN 0.19% 0.99 67 -0.34% -1.16 61 
NYMEX Natural Gas, Henry Hub NG 0.24% 0.45 129 -0.34% -0.76 94 
        Table 5
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Table 6 displays the result for Scenario 3. In the food and agricultural group, certain 
contracts such as CME Lean Hog, Liffe Sugar and Liffe Cocoa are starting to show 
signs of overreaction, while the proportion of the rest of contracts that are still 
showing sufficient evidence of under-reaction is smaller compared to that in scenario 
1. Results in metals and energy remain mostly random. In general, results from 
Scenario 3 show insufficient evidence for either overreaction or under-reaction, due to 
scattered results and small sample size. 
 
Results in this Scenario 3, although derived from a smaller sample size, remain in line 
with our prior hypothesis that market is inclined to show stronger over-reaction and 
weaker under-reaction in the next day when the initial price change on the previous 
day is larger. This matches with the findings of Larson and Mardura(2003) in the 
equity market. As more has been incorporated into market prices in the extreme 
movement in the prior day, the amount of private information that could cause 
under-reaction in the following day is less; hence under-reaction becomes less evident 
in Scenario 3.
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Scenario 3 
 
Next day 
Return of 
Bullish 
Events 
t value obs 
Next day 
Return of 
Bearish 
Events 
t value obs 
Food and Agriculture 
CBOT Soybean Oil Crude BO 0.25% 2.09 436 0.09% 0.61 289 
LIFFE Coffee, Robusta (10 Tonne) LQ 0.43% 1.62 154 -0.08% -0.38 136 
CME Cattle Feeder(Average) FC 0.27% 3.6 162 -0.15% -1.48 171 
CBOT Wheat  No. 2 Soft Red W- 0.12% 0.88 314 0.00% 0.02 265 
WCE Canola  No. 1 WC 0.11% 0.9 271 -0.37% -3.04 226 
CBOT Soybean Meal  48% Protein SM 0.25% 1.82 419 0.07% 0.41 290 
CME Hogs, Lean  Average IowaS Minn 
LH 
-0.84% -2.11 46 1.24% 1.58 52 
ICE Coffee C Columbia KC 0.34% 1.19 273 -0.06% -0.3 249 
KCBT Wheat  No. 2 Hard Winter KW 0.33% 2.27 304 0.10% 0.67 235 
CME Cattle Live Choice Average LC 0.25% 2.53 124 -0.16% -1.32 138 
CBOT Soybeans  No. 1 Yellow S- 0.23% 2.24 429 -0.09% -0.8 383 
TYCOM Rubber #3 YR 0.22% 0.7 96 -0.78% -2.56 128 
ICE Cotton  1-1 16 CT -0.13% -1.07 269 -0.03% -0.26 271 
LIFFE Sugar #5, White LW -0.26% -1.66 128 0.41% 1.72 108 
LIFFE Cocoa #7 LO -0.29% -1.47 168 0.18% 0.98 148 
Metals 
Comex Copper High Grade HG -0.04% -0.29 383 0.16% 1.27 328 
Comex Gold GC 0.04% 0.27 266 0.09% 0.9 259 
COMEX Silver SI 0.18% 1.07 372 -0.31% -1.89 364 
Energy 
NYMEX Crude Oil WTI CL -0.11% -0.48 180 -0.21% -0.88 171 
NyMEX Heating Oil HO -0.11% -0.42 203 -0.05% -0.21 186 
NYMEX Crude Oil Brent NB -0.24% -1.08 156 0.08% 0.33 131 
TYCOM Kerosene IO 0.58% 2.8 63 -0.28% -0.86 51 
ICE Gas-Oil-Petroleum LF 0.06% 0.24 165 -0.33% -1.56 144 
NYMEX Gasoline, Blendstock RB 0.03% 0.06 47 0.06% 0.12 52 
Tocom Gasoline IN 0.02% 0.07 36 -0.23% -0.78 51 
NYMEX Natural Gas, Henry Hub NG -0.03% -0.05 120 -0.29% -0.83 109 
       Table 6 
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Our result so far displays evidence for under-reaction in food and agricultural 
commodity futures in general, while the energy and metal sector shows insignificant 
sign of either overreaction or under-reaction. Future contracts that are less active are 
also more inclined to under-react compared to future contracts that are fully developed 
and actively used by hedgers and investors. In the meantime, results from Scenario 2 
and 3 have echoed with the hypothesis by Hong and Stein (1999) that under-reaction 
is caused by the gradual incorporation of information among investors.  
 
To test the robustness of our results, we used the AR II model to measure the 
predictability of the next of event-day return relative to the return on the event day. 
We did this for all contracts studied that had showed signs of under-reaction in 
Scenario 1. The result of the regression is shown in table 7 below. While the R-Square 
is generally a bit small,  The R Square statistics show stronger predictability in meat 
commodities compared to agricultural contracts, in line with the results indicated by 
t-stats.
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Scenario 1 
 
Next day 
return of 
bullish 
events 
t 
value obs 
Next day 
return of 
bearish 
events 
t 
value obs R2 
CBOT Soybean Oil 
Crude BO 0.21% 4.5 1683 -0.06% -1.35 1548 0.51% 
LIFFE Coffee 
Robusta (10 Tonne) 
LQ 
0.39% 3.43 518 -0.27% -2.36 478 2.35% 
CME Cattle Feeder 
(Average) FC 0.18% 6.36 1168 -0.12% -3.38 1037 2.97% 
CBOT Wheat  No. 2 
Soft Red W- 0.09% 1.88 1522 -0.08% -2 1525 0.50% 
WCE Canola  No. 1 
WC 0.09% 1.94 1065 -0.23% -5.09 1018 0.99% 
CBOT Soybean Meal  
48% Protein SM 0.24% 4.19 1547 -0.09% -1.24 1308 0.26% 
CME Hogs, Lean  
Average LH 0.18% 3.22 903 -0.08% -1 792 1.71% 
ICE Coffee C 
Columbia KC 0.13% 1.35 1043 -0.04% -0.51 1023 0.41% 
KCBT Wheat  No. 2 
Hard Winter KW 0.20% 3.72 1273 -0.10% -2.02 1138 0.34% 
CME Cattle Live 
Choice Average LC 0.21% 7.16 1291 -0.11% -3.14 1168 2.49% 
CBOT Soybeans  No. 
1 Yellow S- 0.15% 3.14 1592 -0.12% -2.36 1438 1.53% 
TYCOM Rubber #3 YR 0.27% 2.61 504 -0.32% -2.53 470 2.10% 
LIFFE Cocoa #7 LO 0.04% 0.59 710 -0.03% -0.35 694 0.62% 
TYCOM Kerosene 
IO 0.34% 3.85 344 -0.16% -1.32 267 2.15% 
ICE Gas Oil 
Petroleum LF 0.15% 1.74 755 -0.12% -1.27 673 0.98% 
Tocom Gasoline IN 0.14% 1.33 292 -0.08% -0.75 284 0.62% 
 Table 7 Regression results for contracts that show signs of under-reaction 
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To fully understand the economic significance of our findings, we built a momentum 
strategy trading on food and agricultural commodities to measure the arithmetic 
average return for the strategy. Details of the strategy are as follows: the trader will 
monitor the standard deviation for the past 200 trading days actively; so when the 
market moved up or moved down more than the standard deviation of the past 200 
days in a certain trading day, or we could call such days event day, the trader will buy 
or sell the corresponding futures contract at the closing price of that day. The position 
will be established in the same direction of the market movement on the event day, 
and will be held until the next day and closed off at the closing price. We assume that 
the trader uses 100% leverage in its trading, which means 50% of the contract value 
will be pledged with the exchange as margin, rather than he 5%-10% typically 
required by the exchange. This level of low leverage ensures that the trader does not 
get into over-loss when extreme market conditions cause market to move against his 
position. Simulations of trades will be carried out respectively for all food and 
agricultural commodities examined in this study, and the Cumulative average return 
will be calculated to derive a yearly return for each product. The return data using 
100% leverage is listed in table 8 below. 
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 Cumulative  Return 
Yearly  
Return 
CBOT Soybean Oil Crude BO 9.179 17.93% 
LIFFE Coffee, Robusta (10 Tonne) LQ 6.623 33.96% 
CME Cattle Feeder(Average) FC 6.781 17.49% 
CBOT Wheat  No. 2 Soft Red W- 5.273 10.30% 
WCE Canola  No. 1 WC 6.652 18.48% 
CBOT Soybean Meal  48% Protein SM 9.765 19.08% 
CME Hogs, Lean  Average IowaS Minn LH 4.449 9.99% 
ICE Coffee C Columbia KC 3.609 9.48% 
KCBT Wheat  No. 2 Hard Winter KW 7.382 18.15% 
CME Cattle Live Choice Average LC 8.04 17.57% 
CBOT Soybeans  No. 1 Yellow S- 8.099 15.82% 
TYCOM Rubber #3 YR 5.741 32.46% 
ICE Cotton  1-1 16 CT 1.524 2.98% 
LIFFE Sugar #5, White LW 0.185 0.91% 
LIFFE Cocoa #7 LO 0.984 4.06% 
 Table 8 Arithmetic cumulative and average return for each contract 
 
From the results above, we are able to find significant yearly return for most food and 
agriculture commodity futures. Among the 15 contracts categories studied, we were 
able to attain yearly return of more than 15% for 9 of them, and yearly return of more 
than 9% for 12 contract categories. The results suggest strong economic significance 
of the under-reaction phenomena in the food and agricultural commodities sector.   
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Summary of Conclusions 
 
Previous studies testing overreaction and under-reaction in he commodity futures 
market have yield mixed results. Some studies have found evidence of overreaction in 
commodity futures, some found evidence of under-reaction, and other found no 
evidence supporting either of these two phenomena.  
 
In this study, we seek to shed light on the existence of under-reaction and overreaction 
in commodity futures using a series of data spanning across meat, agricultural, metal 
and energy commodities. By examining the return data for three different scenarios, 
we have been able to find strong evidence of under-reaction in the food and 
agricultural commodity market. The result appears to be both statistical and 
economical significant, and is more evident in less active commodity contracts. 
Evidence in our findings appear to support the hypothesis by Hong and Stein (1999) 
that under-reaction is caused by the gradual incorporation of information; it also 
echoes with findings by Larson and Mardura 2003 and 2001, which shows that market 
is more inclined to overreact after an extreme initial price change in the previous day.  
 
Based on our findings in Scenario 1, we were able to form a momentum strategy in 
the food and agricultural commodities sector. By conducting basic in-sample tests on 
this momentum strategy, we were able to obtain economically significant return on 
most contracts; this has further boosted the implication of our findings.  
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Despite these, due to insufficient time and resources, we were unable to dig further in 
certain aspect of our findings. Further research on the reason that under-reaction was 
only found in food and agricultural contracts but not meals and energy contracts could 
be studied, and the application of momentum strategy to profit from the 
under-reaction in food and agricultural commodities could be examined in more 
detail. 
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